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As is well known, postwar changes in fertility and mortality rates are leading to an un-
precedented aging of the developed world. By mid-century roughly half of all Japanese and
Europeans will be older than 50 and half of Americans will be older than 42. The projected
rise in dependency rates portends major increases in payroll and other tax rates. This paper
explores the roles of fertility and mortality in altering ﬁscal and economic performance over the
short, medium, and long runs. Our key goal is understanding whether higher fertility or higher
mortality could signiﬁcantly ameliorate the pending old-age ﬁscal crisis.
As a rule, fertility and mortality rates in developed countries are very low. But there is
remarkable heterogeneity in these rates across ﬁrst-world countries. In the U.S., for example,
the current fertility rate is very close to the 2.1 rate needed, absent immigration, to replace
the population. In Italy, in contrast, the current rate is only 1.2! At this rate, Italy can look
forward to a 28 percent smaller population in 2050. While Italy has the lowest fertility rate
in the pre-merger EU (EU-15), almost all of its fellow member states, including France, Spain,
and Germany, are projected to depopulate over this century. Japan is in the same boat. Unless
things change, it will shed a quarter of its population by mid century.
The striking low fertility rates in the EU and Japan are hard to believe. They are
even harder to accept as permanent. This explains why the OECD, the United Nations (see
UNPD, 2003), and individual governments foresee, albeit with little justiﬁcation, major fertility
rebounds in the near term.
Life expectancy has increased steadily in the developed world, but starting from diﬀerent
levels and progressing at diﬀerent rates. Between 1950 and 2000 U.S. life expectancy (for both
sexes combined) rose by 7.3 years (from 69.9 to 76.2 years). Over the same period the respective
Japanese and Western European lifespan expansions rose by 16.6 years (from 63.9 to 80.5) and
10.1 years (from 67.6 to 77.7), see UNPD (2003). These longevity increases arose primarily
because of improvements in survival after age 65.
Today’s demographers are engaged in an intense debate about the future course of longevi-
ty. Some think it will continue to rise, while others think it will reach a natural limit (see
Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). The United Nations projections take an intermediate position.
They assume that life expectancy will rise through 2050, but at half the rate experienced over
the second half of the 20th Century.
Our goal is understanding how future changes in fertility and mortality rates will alter
future economic and ﬁscal conditions. Theory alone provides no clear answers. Take a rise in
fertility rates. Such a change increases the number of future tax payers and, thereby, generates
more future revenues. But it also increases public education and health expenditures and other
child-speciﬁc government outlays. Since ﬁscal systems and conditions are quite diﬀerent across
countries, it isn’t clear whether the short-run ﬁscal costs of more children exceed, equal, or fall
short of the long-run ﬁscal beneﬁts. Nor is there a deﬁnitive empirical answer to this question.
Indeed, previous research on the ﬁscal and economic eﬀects of fertility changes is quite limited1.
1Cutler, et. al. (1990) argue that lower fertility would have a positive economic impact in the U.S. by
2Turning to reductions in mortality rates, we know that increased longevity spells higher
total beneﬁt payments to current and future elderly. As Lee and Skinner (1999) stress, this
implies a higher ﬁscal burden and, generally speaking, less saving and capital formation. But
lifespan extension should also lead people to save more for their longer projected retirements.
Bloom, et. al. (2003) provide empirical support for this view. On the other hand, Skinner
(1985) argues that rising longevity will reduce savings if bequests are purely altruistic and
annuity markets are incomplete.
The present paper aims to improve our understanding of the interaction between demo-
graphic changes and economic outcomes. The framework for our analysis is an updated version
of the three-region dynamic life-cycle simulation model developed in Fehr, Jokisch, and Kot-
likoﬀ (2004a, b). The three regions are the U.S., Japan, and the EU. There is a single good
that can either be consumed or invested at home or abroad; i.e., there is international capital
mobility. In contrast to capital, labor is not mobile internationally, and immigration to each
region is exogenous. The model has been updated to incorporate the UNPD’s (2003) medium
baseline population projections as well as the latest ﬁscal indicators. Our baseline simulations
are bearers of bad news. They generate major tax hikes to pay the elderly their beneﬁts, a
signiﬁcant capital shortage, a reduction in pre-tax wages of roughly 20 percent, and an increase
in the world interest rate of 50 percent. These baseline simulation results are predicated on the
UNPD assumption that fertility rates in the U.S., Japan, and the EU quickly and permanently
return to levels consistent with zero population growth. For the U.S. this means a modest
decline in fertility below the current roughly 2.1 rate in order to oﬀset the country’s high rate
of immigration. For Japan and the EU, this means a major rise in fertility rates.
What would happen were current fertility rates to persist for the next half century and,
only then, revert to ZPG-consistent levels? The answer, in the case of the U.S., is lower payroll
tax rates, but higher income tax rates; i.e., less ﬁscal pressure on the social security system,
but more ﬁscal pressure on the rest of the government’s budget due to the need to pay for more
schooling and other needs of children. Exactly the opposite happens in the EU and Japan. But
the key lesson learned from these simulations is not what changes, but what doesn’t change. The
overall economic and ﬁscal impacts of these quite signiﬁcant fertility changes are surprisingly
small and take a long time to materialize. The dog also fails to bark in our simulations of
signiﬁcant reductions in mortality rates. These simulations generate no major economic or
ﬁscal eﬀects.
We proceed by discussing the model’s structure, detailing its calibration, presenting its
baseline simulation, and then assessing the eﬀects on the demographic transitions of the three
regions of deviations from baseline fertility and mortality rates.
inducing a higher rate of technological progress. Guest and McDonald (2002) analyze the economic consequences
of declining birth rates for Australia and conclude that future living standards are positively aﬀected. Heijdra
and Ligthart (2004) ﬁnd that a drop in the fertility rate decreases the per capita capital stock and increases
per capita consumption. And Berkel, et. al. (2004) show that higher fertility rates would improve the long-run
ﬁnances of German’s pension system.
3II. The Structure of the World Economy2
Our model builds on Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ’s (1987) overlapping generation (OLG) model,
which also simulates demographic transitions by specifying an exogenous population projection
for a ﬁxed number of years followed by ZPG birth rates and stable death rates. Kotlikoﬀ,
Smetters, and Walliser (2001) extended this approach for the U.S. by incorporating age-speciﬁc
fertility, lifespan extension, intergenerational earnings heterogeneity, and additional ﬁscal insti-
tutions. Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ (2004a, b) included lifespan uncertainty as well as bequests
arising from incomplete annuitization. They also introduced multiple regions with international
capital mobility and immigration. As in Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), our model
features monozygotic reproduction with agents in their child-bearing years giving birth each
year to fractions of children. This means of ﬁnessing actually marriage and family formation
permit us to incorporate changes through time in age-speciﬁc fertility rates and to line up our
model’s age-speciﬁc population counts closely to those forecast for the three regions.
We assume that agents care about their children’s utility when they are young and make
consumption expenditures on behalf of their children in accordance with these preference. We
also assume that agents die with realistic mortality probabilities starting at age 68. Agents
fully appreciate the uncertainty of their longevities and maximize, at any point in time, their
expected remaining lifetime utilities. The inclusion of lifespan uncertainty permits a realistic
modeling of bequests and inheritances. We generate bequests by assuming, realistically, that
agents fail to annuitize their assets in old age. Hence, when they die, they leave undesired
bequests to their children3. Since agents die at diﬀerent ages and have children of diﬀerent
ages, their heirs also inherit at diﬀerent ages. Older heirs who were born when their parents
were young receive inheritances later in their life than do their younger siblings. Finally,
uninsurable lifespan uncertainty also leads to a gradual decline in consumption in old age. This
is another important feature of actual longitudinal age-consumption proﬁles.
Our model includes capital adjustment costs. As is well known, these costs can drive
temporary wedges between the marginal products of capital in diﬀerent regions and lead the
market values of capital assets to temporarily diﬀer from their replacement costs. Thus inclusion
of adjustment costs in the model generates what amounts to regional stock markets and permits
us to explore how population aging aﬀects stock prices through time.
A ﬁnal key feature of our framework is its intra-cohort disaggregation. As in Kotlikoﬀ,
Smetters and Walliser (2001), we distinguish three income classes within each generation each
with its own earnings ability. Immigrants are also split into these income classes permitting us
to simulate the arrival of immigrants with diﬀerent stocks of human and physical capital.
The following sections present the general structure of our model. A more detailed de-
scription is provided in Fehr et. al. (2003).
2This section draws heavily on Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ (2004a, b).
3This treatment of bequests ﬁnds support in a recent study by Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ, Sefton, and Weale (2001),
which shows that undesired bequests can explain both the level, Gini coeﬃcient, and skewness of wealth in the
U.S.
41. Demographics
Each region is populated by households who live at most to age 90. Consequently, there
are 91 generations with surviving members at any point in time. The individual life cycle of a
representative agent is described in Figure 1. Between ages 0 and 20 our agents are children
who earn no money and are supported by their parents. At age 21 our agents leave their
parents and go to work. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents give birth to fractions of children
at the beginning of each period, i.e. the ﬁrst (fraction of) children are born when the agents
are 23 and the last are born when they are age 45. An agent’s ﬁrst-born children (fractions of
children) leave home when the parents are age 43, while the last-born leave when the agents
are age 66. Our agents die between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death is 1 at age 91.
Children always outlive their parents, meaning that parents always outlive grandparents. To
see this note that if a parent reaches age 90, his or her oldest children will be 67. These are
children who were born when the parent was age 23.
Figure 1: The individual life-cycle
-
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Age
In each year new immigrants in each skill and age group arrive with the same number and
age distribution of children and the same level of assets as natives of the identical skill and age.
Since the demographic structure has the same form in all three regions, it suﬃces to discuss a
representative region and omit region indices.
To specify the current and future demographic structure of each region we start with the
year-2000 age-speciﬁc population [N(a,2000)] and age-speciﬁc net-immigration [NM(a,2000)]
counts.
In constructing existing as well as future age-population counts, we have to link each
initial cohort between the ages of 1 and 68 to those of their parents who are still alive. The
reason is that children receive bequests from their parents and the levels and timing of these
inheritances depend on the ages of their parents. This linkage is achieved by applying past
fertility rates to each cohort under age 69 in year 2000. If, for example, 15 percent of the
parents of newborns in 1980 were 25 years old, then 15 percent of the 20-year-old’s in year
2000 are assigned to parents age 45. In addition, each cohort is split into three income classes
k. Speciﬁcally, we assume that 30 percent of each cohort belong to the lowest income class,
10 percent to the top income class, and the remaining 60 percent to the middle income class.
Formally, we denote the ﬁnal population vector for year 2000 as N(a,2000,s,k) where a =
1,...,90, s = 23,...,45, k = 1,2,3. The term s references the age of the parent at the time
of birth of agents age a in 2000.
To determine the evolution of the population in each region over time, we applied region-
and age-speciﬁc mortality [d(a,i)] and birth rates to the cohorts alive in year 2000 as well
5as to their children as they reach their ages of fertility and mortality. In the baseline path
the exogenous current and future mortality and fertility rates follow the medium variant of
the latest United Nations population projections (UNPD, 2003). Consequently, mortality is
decreasing in all three regions until 2050, but the Japanese have a signiﬁcantly higher life
expectancy than do Americans or EU citizens. Figure 2 shows our agent’s life expectancies at
birth in the baseline path which is kept constant after year 2050. The respective numbers are
higher than the actual values, since our model’s agents don’t die prior to age 68. However,
the model’s life expectancies conditional on reaching age 60 are close to those reported by the
UNPD (2003).
Figure 2: Life expectancy
-
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Figure 3: Total fertility (birth per woman)
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Total fertility rates currently equal 2.1, 1.3, and 1.5 in the U.S., Japan, and the EU,
respectively. Nevertheless the United Nations expects fertility rates in all three regions to
converge to 1.85 children by 2050. This path of fertility rates is shown in Figure 3. In the
baseline path, we assume annual net immigration of 1 million per year in the U.S., 450,000
in the EU, and 54,000 in Japan. Given the population age structure in year 2000 as well as
projected future fertility, mortality, and net immigration rates, we compute the population
vector N(a,t,s,k) for the years t between 2001 and 2050. After year 2050, fertility rates are
endogenously adjusted in order to achieve zero population growth and a stable population age
structure. Since net immigration is positive, the required fertility rates are below 2.0.
The straight lines in Figures 4 and 5 report the resulting change in the total population and
the dependency ratio. Due to high fertility and net immigration rates, the U.S. population is
projected to increase from 275 million in 2000 to 442 million in 2100. In Europe, the population
falls over the century from 375 to 340 million. And in Japan, the population falls from 126
million to just 85 million! As one would expect, dependency ratios are increasing in all three
regions through 2050. However, the three regions experience important diﬀerences in the aging
of their populations. First, the increase in the dependency ratio is much greater in Japan and
Europe than in the U.S. Second, dependency ratios fall in Europe and Japan after peaking in
year 2050, while they remain roughly stable after 2030 in the U.S.
Figures 4 and 5 also show the consequences of alternative fertility and mortality assump-
tions. If fertility in the U.S. remains at its currently relatively high level through 2050, the
6Figure 4: Total population (in mio.)
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Figure 5: Dependency ratio (60-90/20-59)







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
(b) EU






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .









. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Japan
Base case Constant fertility Constant mortality
Lower mortality







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
















. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7population will increase to 505 million by 2100. In contrast, keeping fertility rates constant
through 2050 in the EU and Japan lowers their respective populations to 268 million and 60
million in 2100. Under these scenarios, dependency ratios would fall relative to the baseline in
the U.S. and increase relative to the baseline in Europe and Japan. However, as shown in Figure
5, it takes quite a while for changes in fertility rates to materially alter dependency ratios. In
contrast to the eﬀects of ﬁxing fertility rates for a half century, ﬁxing mortality rates at their
current values reduces the future populations and the dependency ratios in all three regions.
However, the eﬀects are much smaller compared to those arising from stabilizing fertility rates.
Of course, the opposite happens, if mortality is increased compared to the baseline scenario.
As already discussed above, the household composition changes when our population ages
and these changes in the number of children aﬀect individual consumption and saving decisions.








23 ≤ a ≤ 65, k = 1,2,3, (1)
where u = max(0;a − 45) and m = min(20,a − 23). Recall that agents younger than 23 have
no children and those over 65 have only adult children, i.e. KID(a,t,k) = 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 22
and 66 ≤ a ≤ 90. Agents in between these ages have children. Take, for example, a 30 year-old
agent. Such an agent has children who were born in the years (a − j) since she/he was 23. In
year t, these children are between age 0 ≤ j ≤ 7. The KID-function (1) sums the total number
of kids of the respective parent-income class generation and divides it by the total number
of parents of age a in year t who belong to income class k. This function takes into account
that the family’s age structure will change over time due to changing fertility. This approach
permits the distribution of births by the age of parents to change over time – an important
improvement relative to the birthing process stipulated in Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001).
2. The Household Sector
As previously mentioned, we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants once the
immigrants have joined the native earnings- and age-speciﬁc cohorts. The model’s preference
structure is represented by a time-separable, nested, CES utility function. Remaining lifetime
utility U(j,t,s,k) of a generation of age j at time t whose parents were age s at time of birth
and who belongs to income class k takes the form
U(j,t,s,k) = V (j,t,s,k) + H(j,t,s,k), (2)
where V (j,t,s,k) records the agent’s utility from her/his own goods and leisure consumption
and H(j,t,s,k) denotes the agent’s utility from the consumption of her/his children. The two



































where c(a,i,s,k) and `(a,i,s,k) denote consumption and leisure, respectively, and i is deﬁned
as i = t+a−j. The children’s consumption of income class k parents who are age a in period
i and whose parents were age s at the time of their birth is deﬁned as cK(a,i,s,k). Note that
the number of children is independent of the grandparent’s age at the time of the birth of the
parents.
Since lifespan is uncertain, the utility of consumption in future periods is weighted by the




[1 − d(u,u − a + i)], (5)
which is determined by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from year t (when the
agent’s age is j) up to year i. Note that d(j,t) is the mortality probability of an agent age j
in year t. The parameters θ,ρ,α and γ represent the “pure” rate of time preference, the in-
tratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure
preference parameter, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure in diﬀerent years, respectively.
Given the asset endowment a(j,t,s,k) of the agent in year t, maximization of (2) is
subject to a lifetime budget constraint deﬁned by the sequence:




(1 + r(t)) + w(t)E(a,k)[h(a,t) − `(a,t,s,k)]
− T(j,t,s,k) − c(j,t,s,k) − KID(j,t,k)cK(j,t,s,k), (6)
where r(t) is the pre-tax return on savings and I(j,t,s,k) denotes the inheritance the agent
receives in year t. When the parents die between age 68 and 90, their remaining assets are split
between their children. Consequently, inheritances of agents who are age j in year t and whose
parents were age s at their birth are deﬁned as follows:
I(j,t,s,k) =
d(j + s) ¯ A(j + s,t,k)
P45
u=23 N(j + s − u,t,u,k)
. (7)
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents who die in year t at
age j + s. The denominator deﬁnes these parents’ total number of children who are between
ages j + s − 45 and j + s − 23 in year t. The receipt of inheritances requires us to distinguish
members of each cohort according to the ages of their parents at birth. The parents’ ages at
9death determine when the children receive their inheritances. While the oldest children (born
when their parents are age 23) receive their inheritances between ages 45 and 67, the youngest
children (born when their parents are age 45) receive their inheritances earlier in life, between
ages 23 and 45.
As in Altig et al. (2001) and Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001), we assume that technical progress
causes the time endowment h(·) of each successive generation to grow at the rate λ, i.e.
h(a,i) = (1 + λ)h(a,i − 1). (8)
Gross labor income of the agent in year t is derived as the product of her/his labor supply
and her/his wage rate. The latter is the product of the gross wage rate w(t) in period t and





ξ(1) = 0.2, ξ(2) = 1.0, ξ(3) = 5.0 (9)
The middle-income class proﬁle is taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52). The shift
parameters ξ(k) are then applied to derive income class-speciﬁc proﬁles. Moreover, since tech-
nological change is an important determinant of secular growth over the life cycle, we multiply
the age-speciﬁc longitudinal earnings ability proﬁle by the term involving λ. Hence, the longi-
tudinal age-wage proﬁle is steeper the greater is the rate of technological change.
The net taxes T(j,t,s,k) of an agent in year t consist of consumption, capital income,
and progressive wage taxes as well as social security contributions net of pensions received. Due
to our assumed ceiling on payroll tax contributions, pension, disability insurance and health-
care contribution rates diﬀer across agents. Each agent’s pension beneﬁts depend on her/his
pre-retirement earnings history, while health care and disability transfers are provided on a per
capita basis to all eligible age groups.
Given individual consumption, leisure, and asset levels of all agents, we can compute the
aggregate variables. For example, the aggregate value of assets A(t+1) in period t is computed
from











Since households die at the beginning of each period, we have to aggregate across all agents
who lived in the previous period in order to compute ¯ A(a + 1,t + 1,k), which we need for the
calculation of bequests, see (7). If we aggregate across agents who live in period t + 1, i.e.,







a(a,t + 1,s,k)N(a,t + 1,s,k) (11)
assets of the arriving immigrants of period t + 1 are included.









E(a,k)[h(a,t) − `(a,t,s,k)]N(a,t,s,k). (12)
3. The Production Sector
The economy is populated by a large number of identical ﬁrms, the total number of which





where K(t) is aggregate capital in period t, ε is capital’s share in production, and φ is a
technology parameter. Since we posit convex capital adjustment cost, the ﬁrms’ marketable
output in year t, Y (t), is given by the diﬀerence between gross output and adjustment costs,
i.e.
Y (t) = F(K(t),L(t)) − 0.5 ψ ∆K(t)
2/K(t) (14)
where ∆K(t) measures investment in year t. The term ψ is the adjustment cost coeﬃcient.
Larger values of ψ imply higher marginal costs of new capital goods for a given rate of invest-
ment. The installation technology is linear homogeneous and shows increasing marginal cost
of investment (or, symmetrically, disinvestment): faster adjustment requires a greater than
proportional rise in adjustment costs.
Corporate taxes, T k(t), are given by
T
k(t) = τ
k(t)[Y (t) − w(t)L(t) − (t)∆K(t)] (15)
where τk(t) and (t) deﬁne the corporate tax rate and the immediate write-oﬀ share of invest-
ment expenditures, respectively. Since adjustment costs are fully and investment expenditures
are partly deductible from the tax base, arbitrage between new and existing capital implies
that the latter has a price per unit of
q(t + 1) = 1 − (t)τ
k(t) + [1 − τ
k(t)]ψ ∆K(t)/K(t). (16)
Similarly, the arbitrage condition arising from proﬁt maximization requires identical re-
turns to ﬁnancial and real investments:
r(t)q(t) = [1 − τ
k(t)]{FK(t) + 0.5 ψ (∆K(t)/K(t))
2} + q(t + 1) − q(t). (17)
The left side gives the return on a ﬁnancial investment of amount q(t), while the return on one
unit of real capital investment is the net return to capital (which includes the marginal product
of capital FK(t) plus the reduction in marginal adjustment costs) and capital gains.
114. The Government Sector
The consolidated government issues new debt ∆B(t) and collects corporate taxes and
net-taxes from households in order to ﬁnance general government expenditures G(t) as well as









T(a,t,s,k)N(a,t,s,k) = G(t) + r(t)B(t). (18)
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government maintains an exogenously ﬁxed
ratio of debt to output. The progressivity of the wage tax system is modeled as in Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Speciﬁcally, marginal wage tax rates rise linearly with the tax base.
PY (t) deﬁnes the aggregate payroll tax base, which diﬀers from total labor earnings due
to the ceiling on taxable wages. This ceiling is ﬁxed at 250 (200, 168) percent of average
income in the U.S. (EU, Japan). Aggregate average social security payroll tax rates ˆ τp, ˆ τh and
ˆ τd are computed each period from the relevant budget constraint for the program and region
in question. For the U.S., we determine the separate values of payroll tax rates for the Social
Security pension system, Medicare, and the Social Security disability insurance systems, i.e.
ˆ τ
p(t)PY (t) = PB(t) ˆ τ
h(t)PY (t) = HB(t) and ˆ τ
d(t)PY (t) = DB(t), (19)
where PB(t),HB(t) and DB(t) are total outlays of the pension, health care, and disability
systems, respectively. In the EU and Japan, disability insurance is part of their respective
state pension systems. Hence, we do not calculate separate disability insurance payroll tax
rates for those regions.
Due to contribution ceilings, individual pension and health insurance payroll tax rates
can diﬀer from the payroll tax rate. Above the contribution ceiling, marginal social security
contributions are zero and average social security contributions fall with the agent’s income. To
accommodate this non-convexity of the budget constraint, we assume that the highest earnings
class in each region pays pension and in the EU and Japan, health insurance payroll taxes, up
to the relevant ceilings, but faces no pension and no health care payroll taxes at the margin.
The other earnings classes are assumed to face the full statutory rate on all earnings. In the
U.S., the disability payroll tax is modeled in an equivalent manner. However, since there is no
ceiling on U.S. Medicare taxes, all earnings groups are assumed to face the health insurance
payroll tax at the margin.
If a k-income class agent, whose parents were s years old at his birth, retires in year z at
the exogenously set retirement age ¯ a(z), her/his pension beneﬁts Pen(a,i,s,k) in years i ≥ z
when he is age a ≥ ¯ a(z) depend linearly on her/his average earnings during his working time
¯ W(z,s,k):
Pen(a,i,s,k) = ω0 + ω1 × ¯ W(z,s,k). (20)
The region-speciﬁc parameters ω0,ω1 were chosen in order to approximate the replacement
rates relative to individual lifetime earnings as reported in Whitehouse (2002).
12General government expenditures G(t) consist of government purchases of goods and ser-
vices, including educational expenditures and health outlays. Over the transition, government
purchases of goods and services are held ﬁxed per capita with an adjustment for annual tech-
nological change. Age-speciﬁc education, health, and disability outlays are also held ﬁxed over
the transition with the same adjustment for technological change. The government’s budget
(18) is balanced each year by adjusting the intercept on our linear formula for the average wage
tax rate.
5. World Equilibrium
Up to now we’ve described the model for the representative economy. The three regions
of the model are connected through the world capital market. Consequently, the aggregate
value of world assets equals the market value of the world-wide capital stock plus the value of









, with W = {U.S.,EU,Japan}. (21)
6. Solving the Model
To solve the model we ﬁrst need to specify the preference, technology, and policy param-
eters. Table 1 reports our main parameter values. The preference and technology parameters
are mostly taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et al. (2001). The reported debt levels in the U.S., Europe and
Japan were chosen to match real interest payments reported in European Commission (2003)
for the year 2000, while the retirement ages are taken from Bloendal and Scarpetta (1999) for
the U.S. and the EU and from Whitehouse (2002) for Japan. The consumption tax rate for
the U.S. is taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001). For the EU, the consumption tax rate is the
unweighted average of the indirect tax rates in the member states. In the case of Japan, the
consumption tax rate is set to match the structure of tax revenues in year 2000. In addition,
we specify the parameters of the progressive wage tax systems in each region in order to gen-
erate realistic average and marginal tax rates (reported below), while the proportional term is
computed endogenously to balance the budget.
In calibrating our model, we use Japanese age-speciﬁc government health care expendi-
tures proﬁles for Japan. In the case of the EU, we use the German proﬁle. For the U.S., the
Medicare program applies only to households older than 65. We assume uniform Medicare
expenditures by age among those over age 65. We make the same uniform age-distribution
assumption with respect to the U.S. disability insurance system, which we assume applies only
to those older than 20 and younger than 65.
We use the German age-speciﬁc education proﬁle for all regions in the model and rescale
it to get realistic education outlays in year 2000 in each region (see below). In addition to these
parameter values, our model requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class
for each region. These proﬁles are region-speciﬁc.4
4Data on Japanese asset proﬁles were provided by Charles Horioka, while the European proﬁles were adjusted
from German data provided by Reinhold Schnabel. U.S. Data were derived from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances.




time preference rate θ 0.02
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.25
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.4
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level φ 1.041 1.048 1.049
capital share in production ε 0.25
adjustment cost parameter ψ 10.0
technical progress λ 0.01
Policy parameters
consumption tax rate (in %) τc 11.3 19.5 13.0
capital tax rate (in %) τr 11.4 13.3 10.0
corporate tax rate (in %) τk 10.0 13.3 15.0
expensing fraction (in %)  20.0 20.0 30.0
debt (in % of national income) B/Y 40 50 48
age of retirement 63 60 60
capital share in the U.S. (in %) 95.8 3.4 0.8
capital share in the EU (in %) 2.0 97.8 0.2
capital share in Japan (in %) 0.7 0.8 98.5
To run our model as an open world economy, we also need to specify how aggregate world
assets are distributed across regions. For each economy, we specify these distributions based on
calculations reported in Kraay, et. al. (2000). Investment in all regions exhibits a strong home
bias. To be precise, more than 90 percent of domestic assets are currently invested in the home
region. The portfolio shares of the diﬀerent regions and the capital stocks in each region in our
initial year 2000 are used to compute aggregate national asset holdings. The initial developed
world capital stock, the regional ratios of government debt to GDP, and the international,
intergenerational, and intragenerational distributions of assets constitute the initial conditions
needed to solve the model. Given these data, our model applies a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to
solve for the perfect foresight general equilibrium transition path of the economy. Our algorithm
starts with initial guesses for capital stocks and labor supplies in each region for the remaining
years of the transition. Next we compute from equation (16) the path of region-speciﬁc market
prices of capital. The path for the world interest rate after 2000 is derived from the arbitrage
condition (17) for the U.S. This condition (17) is also used to update values of the existing
capital stock in year 2000 in each region. Next, regional wage rates are computed by setting
them equal to their respective marginal products of labor. From the capital market equilibrium
14condition (21) we derive the values of the national capital stock and government debt. These
aggregate values are next distributed to the savers of the diﬀerent regions based on the current
portfolio shares. Next we update the initial age-speciﬁc asset holdings in year 2000 for each
region in order to match the computed aggregate national savings. Given the initial individual
assets, the time path of tax rates (which are based on guesses in the ﬁrst iteration) and factor
prices, household decisions on consumption and labor supply are computed and aggregated.
Then we update the path for wage tax rates, the social security payroll tax rate, and debt
given the government budget constraints (18) and (19). Finally, we compute new paths for
the capital stocks in each region using the capital market equilibrium condition (21) as well as
(16). The new values for capital and labor are then weighted with the initial guesses of these
supplies to form guesses of the time paths of these variables. The algorithm then iterates until
the paths of capital stock and labor converge to a ﬁxed point. We give our economy 300 years
to reach to a steady state. In fact, our model reaches a steady state to many decimal places
prior to year 300. It also converges very tightly around the equilibrium transition path.
IV. Initial Equilibrium and the World Economy’s Baseline Transition Path
Table 2 reports key macroeconomic variables in 2000 in the three regions. Note that there
is a fairly close accordance between actual and computed national income account measures
of private consumption and government purchases. The one exception is Japanese government
purchases. The oﬃcial data seem too high given the reported ratio of tax revenues to national
income. In our calibration, we chose to benchmark government purchases based on the ratio of
tax revenues to national income.
The reported shares in education, pensions and health are very close to actual levels5.
The same applies to the social security payroll tax rates and the level and progressivity of the
three income taxes. Concerning the overall structure of tax revenues, the assumed tax rates
on capital income, corporate income and consumption as well as the expensing fractions (see
Table 1) yield a realistic pattern6. Finally, the model’s year-2000 capital-output ratios seem
reasonable not only relative to U.S. Commerce Department ﬁgures, but also in terms of the
year-2000 interest rate, which equals 8.1 percent. As discussed in Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ
(2004b), calibrating the model to a lower initial capital-output ratio will alter the extent to
which simulated capital-labor ratios decline and real wages fall over the developed world’s
transition path.
Now we turn to the simulation results for the baseline transition where, to repeat, we
incorporate the medium variant of the United Nations population projections. The transition
paths for the three regions are reported in the upper panels of Tables 3 to 5 for the U.S., EU
and Japan.
Although the economies are aging, the baseline path shows a steadily increase in eﬀective
labor supply in all three regions. This may seem surprising especially for Japan and the EU
where the population and work force decline over time (see Figure 4). The explanation lies in
our assumed rate of labor-augmenting technological change permitting greater eﬀective labor
5See European Commission (2003), Dang et al. (2001, 26), IPSS (2003, 3) and OECD (2002, 178 and 2003).
6Actual values are calculated from European Commission (2003) and Joumard (2001).
15Table 2: The year 2000 of the baseline path*
Model Oﬃcial**
U.S. EU Japan U.S. EU Japan
National Income
private consumption 78.2 70.3 73.1 77.6 67.8 67.8
government purchases of goods and services 22.9 32.6 22.3 23.0 32.1 33.4
current account -1.3 -0.8 5.2 -4.6 -0.4 3.0
Government indicators
aggregate education outlays 5.9 6.0 4.2 5.9 6.0 4.3
aggregate pension beneﬁts 6.2 11.5 10.8 5.7 11.6 10.8
aggregate health beneﬁts 2.2 6.3 5.2 2.5 6.2 6.8
aggregate disability beneﬁts 1.3 - - 0.9 - -
pension contribution rate (in %) 8.9 17.1 16.7 10.6 - 17.3
health care contribution rate (in %) 2.9 9.4 8.0 2.9 - 8.0
disability insurance contribution rate (in %) 1.9 - - 1.9 - -
Tax revenues 21.9 29.8 20.7 26.6 32.5 20.7
direct taxes 13.1 16.1 11.2 17.9 16.5 10.5
personal income taxes 10.6 12.7 7.4 14.7 12.8 6.2
wage taxes 7.4 9.0 4.9 - - -
capital taxes 3.2 3.7 2.5 - - -
corporate income taxes 2.5 3.4 3.8 3.2 3.7 4.3
indirect taxes 8.8 13.7 9.5 8.7 16.0 10.2
Wage tax rates (in %)
average 10.2 12.1 6.6 - - -
marginal 17.2 18.2 12.1 - - -
capital output ratio 3.2 3.2 2.8 - - -
interest rate (in %) 8.1 - - -
* in percent of national income if not stated diﬀerent
** European Commission (2003)
16supply by each successive cohort. Thus, the future decrease in the labor force is oﬀset in the EU
and Japan and the growth in the actual number of workers in the U.S. is augmented. However,
eﬀective labor supply grows at much diﬀerent rates in the three regions. In Japan it increases
by 63 percent over the century. In the EU it more than doubles over the same period. And
in the U.S. it increases over the century by a factor of four. The diﬀerences in eﬀective labor
supply growth across the three regions materially aﬀect overall economic growth. In the U.S.
output grows by a factor of 3.6 over the next 100 years. It grows by a factor of 2.2 in the EU
and 1.4 in Japan.
A second key feature of our base-case simulation is the emergence over time of a signiﬁcant
capital shortage. Although the overall capital stock doubles in the U.S. over the century, capital
per unit of human capital declines. This development is even more dramatic in the EU and
Japan where the capital stocks fall during the transition. The observed capital shortages lower
real wages per unit of human capital by 16 percent in Japan and by almost 20 percent in the
U.S. and the EU over the course of the century. The associated increase in the real interest
rate over this period is 390 basis points. This major crowding out of capital can be explained
by the increases in the payroll and wage tax rates, which are reported in the last two columns
of the charts. Over the century, combined social security payroll tax and wage tax rates rise
by 77 percent in the U.S., by 64 percent in the EU, and by 79 percent in Japan. By 2100,
the combined payroll plus average wage tax rate equals 42.4 percent in the U.S., 63.5 percent
in the EU, and 56.2 percent in Japan. These very high rates of taxation reduce the ability of
workers to save and, therefore, accumulate claims to physical capital.
The Tables also show that the diﬀerent timing of the aging process in the three regions
induces major capital ﬂows. Since aging is much more severe in Europe and Japan, the U.S.
experiences capital inﬂows from these regions throughout the century. Consequently, the initial
U.S. current account deﬁcit of 1.3 percent of national income improves rather slowly and ﬁnally
turns into a surplus in the second half of the century. The opposite happens in the capital-
exporting countries. In the EU, the initial current account deﬁcit improves but returns to a
deﬁcit again after 2040. In Japan the initial current account surplus of 5.2 percent declines
steadily until the aging process peaks in the second half of the century.
Despite the aging process, asset prices increase in the U.S. and in Europe, but they fall
temporarily in Japan below their initial values. The latter outcome supports the widely held
belief that aging will lower worldwide capital prices as the growing number of elderly start
to sell their assets. Our simulations suggest that this eﬀect will only be signiﬁcant in Japan,
although asset prices are also dampened in the other countries.
The ﬁnal columns report the development of bequests (relative to national income (NI))
during the transition. While many people believe that bequests will rise signiﬁcantly during
the aging process, our results belie this view. This perhaps surprising result is mainly due to
the increase in life expectancy during the transition. Reductions in mortality rates reduce the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23V. The Impact of Fertility Changes
This section considers what happens if fertility rates remain at their current levels through
2050. Since in the baseline path fertility rates fall in the U.S. and increase in the EU and in
Japan, constant birth rates imply (compared to the baseline path) lower population growth in
the EU and in Japan and higher population growth in the U.S. compared with the baseline
paths (see Figures 4 and 5). In order to distinguish the diﬀerent eﬀects at work we analyze
three isolated changes in fertility (compared to the baseline) in each region as well as a fourth
scenario in which birth rates change in the U.S., the EU, and Japan simultaneously.
1. Higher Fertility in the U.S.
The second panels in Tables 3 through 5 show the impacts of keeping the initial fertility
rate of 2.11 births per woman in the U.S. ﬁxed through 20507. In this simulation EU and
Japanese birth rates follow the same paths as shown in Figure 3.
The higher short-term U.S. fertility rate increases that country’s total population as well
as its eﬀective labor supply. The latter variable is ﬁrst aﬀected in 2022 when the ﬁrst cohort
generated by the higher birth rate enters the labor force. Eﬀective labor supply in 2100 is
raised by 17 percent and national income by 16 percent relative to the baseline simulation.
Due to the younger population age-structure and the increased labor supply, social security
contribution rates in the U.S. decrease. In 2100 the social security payroll tax is 25.9 percent,
compared to 28 percent in the base case. However, the average wage tax rate rises. Compared
with the base case results, the average wage tax rate is 1.2 percentage points higher in 2075 and
0.6 percentage points higher in 2100. This reﬂects the need to ﬁnance additional government
expenditures associated with the population increase. Due to these opposite eﬀects on after-tax
wage income, the capital stock in 2100 is only 12 percent higher relative to the base case leading
to a further decline in the capital-labor ratio. Hence, the pre-tax wage in the medium and long
run is somewhat lower than in the base case and asset prices and the interest rate are slightly
increased. Note also that bequests are slightly lower in the long run. This appears due to the
fact that agents save less for their old age when they have more children.
There is very little impact on the EU and Japanese economies of maintaining high fertility
in the U.S. through 2050. The U.S. attracts capital from the other two areas thanks to its more
rapid growth in eﬀective labor supply. Consequently, in the medium run the current accounts
in the EU and Japan show increased capital exports compared to the baseline transition. These
larger capital exports from the EU and Japan lead to small reductions in the levels of EU and
Japanese national income. This explains why the social security payroll taxes in the EU and
Japan rise somewhat between 2050 and 2100 relative to their base-case transition values.
7After 2050 fertility rates gradually decline again to their long run value of 1.8 in order to achieve a zero
long-run population growth rate.
242. Lower Fertility in the EU and Japan
The next two simulations, reported in the third and fourth panels of Tables 3-5, respec-
tively, assume that fertility in the EU and Japan remains at their current levels of 1.46 and
1.28 births per woman through 2050. Again, after 2050, birth rates rise to achieve long-run
zero population growth8.
The lower short-run fertility rates lead to smaller work forces and total populations in
the EU and in Japan. In the EU, for example, labor supply in 2100 is 22 percent smaller and
national income 21 percent smaller compared to the baseline values. These are big diﬀerences.
In Japan, the maintenance of current fertility patterns through 2050 reduces eﬀective labor
supply at the end of the century by 32 percent and national income by over 40 percent. Indeed,
the absolute size of the Japanese economy (as measured by national income) is smaller in 2100
than in 2000 notwithstanding 100 years of technological progress!
As Figures 4 and 5 show, dependency ratios in both regions rise compared to the baseline
path. This necessitates larger increases in social security tax rates. On the other hand, average
wage tax rates are slightly reduced during the early stages of the transitions since government
expenditures decrease with the reduction in the sizes of the overall populations. After 2075,
however, the reduction in the eﬀective labor supply outweighs this factor and wage tax rates
rise relative to the baseline paths. Consequently, households save less and export more capital
to the U.S. Asset prices and the capital stock in both regions decline sharply compared to
the base case. The somewhat higher capital-labor ratios during the transition increase pre-tax
wages slightly.
Finally, note that the constant fertility rate simulations for Europe and Japan generate
rather small spillover eﬀects for the other two economies whose fertility rates evolve according
to the base-case assumptions.
3. Constant Fertility in All Regions
Our ﬁnal fertility simulation maintains constant fertility rates for 50 years in all three
regions. In this simulation, opposite eﬀects are at work. While the population in the U.S. is
younger than in the base case, the European and Japanese economies are confronting a more
severe aging process. Nevertheless, the resulting eﬀects (see the ﬁfth panels of Tables 3-5) are
very much the same as in the scenarios with the isolated fertility changes.
VI. The Impact of Changes in Life Expectancy
This section analyzes the economic eﬀects of changing life expectancy in our model. As
discussed in the introduction, no one knows whether longevity will continue to grow or reach a
limit. Since the baseline path takes a median view with slowly decreasing mortality rates, the
present section considers two extreme alternatives: a much sharper increase in life expectancy
and a scenario in which mortality rates remain at their current levels. Japan oﬀers an interesting
special case since some projections assume a rise in longevity beyond 90 years, see Oeppen and
8In the EU this means a gradual increase in the fertility rate to 1.77 births per woman and in Japan a rise
to 1.86 births per woman.
25Vaupel (2002). In our model this means that life span uncertainty completely vanishes as well
as unintended bequests. Therefore, we ﬁrst consider a scenario, where life expectancy in Japan
increases to 91 years between 2000 and 2050 and remains at 91 thereafter, with no probability
of dying prior to age 91. Next we increase life expectancy in all three regions through 2050
and keep it constant afterwards. The third simulation is inspired by Yakita (2001) who claims
that an increase in life expectancy will lower fertility rates in Japan. Consequently we consider
both a rise in life expectancy in Japan as well as the maintenance in Japan for the next half
century of its current very low fertility rate.
1. Higher Life Expectancy in Japan
The simulation shown in the sixth panels of Tables 3-5 assumes that life expectancy at
birth rises in Japan to age 91 by 2050 and remains constant thereafter. Life expectancy in the
U.S. and EU follows the baseline path.
Higher life expectancy in Japan is expected to increase savings since agents need to ﬁnance
longer retirements. However, the results in Table 5 show only a slight increase in the capital
stock compared to the base case. The explanation here is twofold. First, rising longevity
leads to a further increase in the dependency ratio compared to the base case (see Figure 5).
Hence, the contribution rates to the pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social security systems rise to a
larger extent during the transition so that in 2100 the payroll tax rates are 3.4 percentage
points higher. This development discourages saving. Second, since in our model life span
uncertainty gradually falls as life expectancy rises, bequests gradually decline until 2050 and
are zero afterwards. Since now the agents consume all their resources in old age by themselves,
savings implicitly fall compared to the baseline path9.
The spill over eﬀects on the U.S. and the EU of the rise in the Japanese life expectancy
are small. There are only slight increases in the capital stocks during the transition which is
due to higher capital imports from Japan. Hence, the current account balances in both regions
deteriorate.
2. Higher Life Expectancy in All Regions
In this section, we consider a simultaneous rise in longevity in all three regions. To be
precise, life expectancy increases to 85 years in the U.S. and 86.9 years in the EU until 2050
compared to 83.8 years and 84.6 years, respectively, in the baseline transition path. These
values ﬁnd support by the projections of Tuljapurkar et al. (2000). For Japan we assume the
same rise in longevity to 91 years as in the scenario above.
As already mentioned above, greater longevity raises the need for more resources after
retirement. Therefore, the labor supply and the capital stock are raised in all three regions
compared to the base case. The broadening of the tax base implies a slight decline in wage
tax rates. However, at the same time, higher life expectancy leads to a rise in the dependency
ratios to a much larger extent relative to the baseline transition path (see Figure 5). Hence,
the social security contribution rates are increased by 1.2 percentage points in the U.S., 2.5
9A similar eﬀect of increased longevity on altruistic bequests is discussed in Skinner (1985).
26percentage points in the EU, and 3.5 percentage points in Japan by 2100. This development
hinders greater capital accumulation so that the increase in the capital stock is lower than in
labor supply. Since agents now consume a bigger part of their resources by themselves, bequests
are lower than in the base case.
While the current account in the EU is hardly aﬀected by this scenario, the current
accounts in the U.S. and Japan change markedly. Since the aging process in the U.S. still is
less severe, more capital is imported from Japan during the ﬁrst 30 years of the transition.
Afterwards, this eﬀect is reversed. Due to the overall capital scarcity, capital prices in all three
regions during the ﬁrst decades of the transition are higher compared to the base case.
3. Constant Life Expectancy in All Regions
Now we turn to a scenario where we keep the mortality in all three regions simultaneously
constant. Hence, the life expectancy in the U.S. is 81.7 years, in the EU 82.2 years and in
Japan 83.8 years during the whole transition path. As a consequence population aging is less
severe in all three regions at the same time. However, Japan still faces the most severe aging
process due to its lower fertility rates and its higher level of longevity compared to the other
two regions. Nevertheless, the eﬀects in Japan are most pronounced since in the base case the
life span increases the most. For the simulation results see the eighth panels of Tables 3-5.
Due to the smaller number of elderly, social security payroll taxes at the peak of the
aging process in 2050 are 2.8 percentage points in the EU, 5 percentage points in Japan and
1.4 percentage points in the U.S. below the corresponding values in the base case. Of course,
this diﬀerence stems from the more signiﬁcant rise in longevity in Japan during the baseline
transition. The capital stock, the eﬀective labor supply, and national income is lower in all
three regions compared to the base case. The bequest-output ratio increases in all regions. In
Japan it even more than doubles in the medium and long run showing the strong dissaving of
the elderly in the baseline path.
Interestingly, the short-run current account deﬁcit in the U.S. and the surplus in Japan
are lower than in the base case. This shows that more capital from the U.S. is invested in
Japan. In the medium and long run, more capital ﬂows from the EU to the U.S. while the
current account in Japan is much the same as in the baseline path. Since people save less,
the initial capital prices are reduced in all regions. However, in the long run the lower capital
stocks push up capital prices.
4. Higher Life Expectancy and Lower Fertility in Japan
Finally, we consider a scenario where we combine higher longevity and lower fertility in
Japan as inspired by Yakita (2001). In this ”‘worst case”’ scenario life expectancy rises again
to 91 years while at the same time fertility is ﬁxed at the initial value of 1.28 births per woman
until 2050. For the U.S. and the EU, the demographic process follows the path as assumed in
the base case. The simulation results are reported in the ninth panels of Tables 3-5.
The changes in the macroeconomic variables in Japan are mostly an addition of the
isolated eﬀects. As a consequence, the increase in the social security tax rates are dramatic
27now. For example, in 2050 the payroll tax rate is 61.6 percent. The payroll and wage tax rate
combined amount to even 70 percent while at the same time wages fall during the transition!
This puts an enormous burden on the households and reduces the incentives to supply labor.
In addition, capital accumulation drops sharply compared to the baseline path which is mainly
due to the reduction in fertility.
Again, spillover eﬀects on the U.S. and EU economy are almost negligible. The ﬁrst part
of the transition shows higher capital ﬂows from Japan to the other two economies compared
to the base case. This eﬀect is reversed in the long run.
VII. Conclusion
This paper applies the three-region dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model intro-
duced by Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ (2004a, b) in order to analyze the economic eﬀects of
changes in fertility and mortality. The original model was modiﬁed in several ways. The new
model includes realistic exogenous portfolio shares for international investment, an improved
Japanese tax structure, corporate taxes and an updated population projection based on the
medium variant of the UNPD (2003). Despite these adjustments, our baseline transition path
highlights the same quantitative implications as in our previous papers. Population aging leads
to a major capital shortage during the century due to dramatically increasing payroll and wage
tax rates. This is accompanied by a decline in wages of almost 20 percent and an increase in
the interest rate by 390 basis points.
Due to the strong home biases of investment ﬂows, the immediate spillover eﬀects of eco-
nomic shocks are now small compared to our previous work. Firstly, we consider the economic
impact of alternative fertility trends in the U.S., EU and Japan. Our ﬁndings suggest that -
in contrast to the public opinion - higher fertility cannot alleviate the demographic stresses.
Although a higher number of births reduces social security contribution rates in the long run,
it increases general government expenditures for education, etc. in the short and medium runs
which oﬀsets the positive eﬀect of reduced payroll tax rates.
With respect to future trends in life expectancy, our simulations suggest that further
increases in longevity have only a modest positive impact on saving rates. Although lower
mortality increases the demand for resources during retirement, it also implies a further increase
in the future payroll tax rates and a decline in unintended bequests, which both tend to reduce
individual and aggregate savings. Due to these counterbalancing eﬀects, capital accumulation
is only modestly aﬀected by changes in life expectancy, and the general economic impact of
mortality trends is much smaller than the impact of fertility trends.
Our bottom lines are a) that there is little reason to expect future changes in fertility
and/or mortality to alleviate the future demographic stresses facing the developed world and
b) the only way to improve future economic conditions in the developed world is to engage in
major and immediate ﬁscal adjustments.
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